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Ample security at acceptable cost is the aim of U.S. strategic retaliatory 
forces, which are assigned primary responsibility for deterring atomic 
attacks against the United States. That aim stays constant, but essential 
force requirements do not. Nuclear systems needed in one context are surplus 
in others. 
Congress, in reviewing proposals, therefore needs some effective way to 
relate retaliatory force requirements With U.S. deterrent strategy before it 
can accurately assess the adequacy of present and projected postures. 
This brief, which provides no definitive "answers" and supports no special 
position, addresses three connected issues: 
-- How many U.S. weapon systems are compulsory? 
- - Which combination would be most suitable? 
-- What force level for each system would serve best? 
Assessments stress fundamental differences between functional classes. 
Bombers accomplish strategic nuclear missions in ways completely .foreign to 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), Which duplicate few strengths 
and weaknesses of submarine-launched counterparts (SLBMs), and so on. 
Improved products within each class perform missions better than 
predecessors, but in much the same way. Piston-powered aircraft and jets, 
for example, both fly from point A to point B. It is fruitless, therefore, 
to argue about relative merits of B-1 bombers and MX missiles before the need 
for any bomber or ICBM has been established. Particular makes and models are 
mentioned only for exemplary purposes. 
NOTE: Tables that support this text are not retrievable on the CRT, but 
may be obtained by requesting hard copies. 
BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
HOW MANY U.S. SYSTEMS? 
The United States, committed to a second-strike strategy, requires 
retaliatory arms that could accomplish assigned missions after absorbing a 
large-scale attack. In addition, the force should afford flexibility, and 
forestall technological surprise. 
Manned bombers fulfilled those functions until the late 1950s. The 
Defense Department deployed fixed-site ICBMs in 1959 for a variety of 
reasons. A triad developed the following year, when Polaris submarines first 
.went to sea. It is important to note, however, that strategic requirements 
did not dominate decisions to construct a triad. Service politics shaped the 
structure as much as military missions. 
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How many systems are really mandatory? 
Most students of the subject agree that no monad, however impressive, 
could fill the bill for long under fast-chang~ng conditions. 
Two systems theoretically could suffice, if pre-launch survivability and 
penetration prospects of both were superlative. Soviet power, for example, 
still depends primarily on two types of ballistic missile, even though 
Sackfire bombers have assumed a significant role. U.S. second-strike 
constraints, however, create doubts that any two U.S. systems deployed or 
under development could safely underpin long-term security, as the next 
section indicates. 
Three systems have served well for the last two decades, but present 
p.roclivities are to reinforce, not reduce, our traditional triad. Seven 
prospects have Seen tested to some extent. Air- and submarine-launched 
cruise missiles (ALCMs, SLCMs), together with semi-mobile ICBMs (SM ICBMs), 
are under active consideration at this time. Freely mobile ICBMs (FM ICBMs), 
a-ir-launched ballistic missiles (ALBMs), baiiistic missiles fired from 
surface ships (SSBMs), and Hydra are waiting in the wings. Shallow 
Underwater Missiles (SUM) on coastal submarines, sometimes called the Shallow 
Undersea Mobile Force, differ in detail from deep water SLBMs, but not enough 
to define a discrete functional category. Airmobile missiles on aircraft 
that land before launch are lumped with ALBMs. 
The Department of Defense considers all experimental systems as possible 
supplements to, rather than replacements for, present components. There is 
no proof, however, that additions would provide a more cost-effective 
deterrent force than three dependable components, which have been sufficient 
so far, The Law of Diminishing Returns would cause the value of dollar 
investments to decline with each new layer, diverting funds unnecessarily 
from other defense and domestic programs, unless budgets were given big 
boosts. 
Plans to expand the U.S. triad to four or more systems seem difficult to 
support when put in that context. 
WHAT SYSTEMS IN COMBISATION? 
What change, if any, in the present mix would serve America's needs most 
completely is more a matter of portents than present capabilities. 
CURRENT TRIAD CONNECTED WITH TRENDS 
The existing U.S. triad seems temporarily sound. Complicated scheduling 
problems make it almost impossible for any foe to compromise SAC bombers and 
silo-based ICBMs simultaneously. Soviet anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 
capabilities are so slim at this stage that U.S. submarines on station at sea 
would escape largely unscathed. 
U.S. retaliatory forces, once committed, seem to have strengths needed to 
accomplish essential missions. 
Ballistic missile warheads would be "home free." The few primitive 
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defenses they face could be quickly overcome. U.S. bombers would have to 
breach the world's most sophisticated and comprehensive air defenses, which 
are deployed in great depth, but planners are Confident that about 75% of our 
9-52s would reach their targets. 
Projected Soviet capabilities, however, suggest that U.S. deterrent powers 
predicated on the present triad may Se perishable. 
The Soviets already have more than four times as many ICSM warheads as SAC 
has missile silos, which are static targets. Most of Moscow's weapons are in 
che megaton range. Power and precision are being improved. Emerging hard 
target capabilities consequently make the security of U.S. fixed-site ICBMs 
an increasingly serious source of concern, since they are undefended. 
B-52 bombers, along with supporting tankers, depend in part on dispersion 
to-ensure pre-launch survival, but runway and parking restrictions limit the 
choice of airstrips. Soviet SLBMs mounting MIRVs, which numbered 192 tubes 
in January 1981, could cover dispersal sites and saturate escape routes much 
more effectively than single-shot missiles, if they choose to shoot from 
short range. Moreover, intelligence analysts indicate that Soviet air and 
civil defenses could deny many crucial targets t d  U.S. manned penetrators 
(especially 3-52s) during this decade. 
Straight-line projections of those trends could cause U.S. deterrence in 
t h e  mid-1980s to depend mainly cn a monad of SLBMs, whose survivability could 
be significantly degraded by Soviet ASW.or ABM breakthroughs that are not 
expected but not impossible. Some corrective steps already are underway, but 
a structured approach to posture improvement still is worth reviewing. 
OPTIONAL ALTERATIONS OF THE TRIAD 
Exclusive reliance on systems with similar characteristics, however 
strong, would reduce U.S. security, not strengthen it. The pre-launch 
survival prospects of air-launched cruise missiles and ALBMs are similar to 
those of manned bombers. SiBMs (including SUM) and sub-launched SLCMs would 
be endangered by a Soviet ASW breakthrough. An effective Soviet ABM shield 
would drastically reduce deterrent properties of - any ballistic missile. 
Diversification thus is in demand, but only within loosely defined limits. 
No rule, for example, states that land-, sea-, or air-launched systems all 
must be represented. Two of the three triad legs could be aloft, ashore, or 
afloat if the resultant combination satisfied U.S. security requirements more 
completely than any other amalgam. 
Which weapon systems would best satisfy U.S. force requirements depends on 
survivability, performance, and total program costs of the complete package. 
High-priced manpower and scarce energy supplies should be taken into account. 
No solution would seem acceptable if it risked great instability or an 
all-out arms race. 
Ten systems that could fit into our triad are prospective competitors. 
Readers should be aware that one salient strength may outweigh many 
weaknesses, and vice versa. Calculations invariably involve subjective 
values. Every combination suffers some shortcomings. The goal is a suitable 
compromise. 
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The selection process would be the sane if two, three, four, or more 
systems were to fit in the final structure. 
One hundred twenty triads, for example, are mathematically possible, with 
10 systems to choose from (see Table I). Almost 90% exhibit distinctly 
undesirable traits: 
,, m ~wency-nine sets overstress "airbreathingv systems. 
contain nothing but ballistic missiles. 
- - Nine put too many eggs in the land-based basket. 
-- Six rely too much on submarine-launched inissiles. 
-- Nineteen change the current triad completely. 
-- Nine include "sitting duck" ICBMs in silos. 
The remaining 13 possibilities are somewhat more attractive. All mingle 
two classes of ballistic missile with a single "air-breather." Eight 
incorporate one airmobile component, with others aloft or afloat. All depend 
on mobility and/or deception to preserve pre-launch survival prospects. 
Every one of those 13 options, however, involves tough tradeoffs: 
-- Four sets embrace semi-mobile ICBMs, which attract the 
attention of Soviet marksmen to known aiminq points in _ the Continental United States (CONUS). 
- - Four sore with freely mobile ICSMs also present targets 
on the American land mass. 
-- Four of those eight possibilities abandon SLBMs, the 
most survivable system presently deployed. 
-- The final five, which feature two dissimilar sea-launched 
systems, lack complete diversity, because they dispense 
with any land-based model. 
U.S. decisionmakers therefore must compare relative merits of various 
combinations to ascertain the most suitable mix. 
SLBMs As the Constant Component 
All options selected for serious study probably should preserve SLBMs, 
which are vulnerable in port, but survivable on station. That stable system 
discourages enemy proclivities to preempt. If armed conflict should develop, 
despite our deterrent, SLBMs would draw few nuclear fires on the United 
States. U.S. responses, triggered at times of our choice, would presently be 
unsuppressible. Counterforce target coverage could be expanded by installing 
warheads with improved accuracies and yields, if U.S. decisionmakers desired. 
Those strengths will remain unshaken until enemy ASW forces acquire high 
confidence that they can locate most U.S. strategic submarines at sea and 
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sink them simultaneously before they launch their missiles, or until Soviet 
AaMs can stop U.S. warheads enroute. 
Replace Fixed-Site ICBMs 
The reduced deterrent value of U.S. fixed-site ICBKs declines at a rate 
that relates directly to the rapid deployment of Soviet counterparts with 
credible hard target capabilities. That process - cannot be impeded 
effectively for long by improving any second-strike system installed in 
silos. 
Silo hardness already is approaching its practical limitation. Even new 
bases in bedrock, prepared at prodigious price, could be destroyed by big 
enough blasts. Expanding the force would be fruitless, for the Soviets could 
add warheads much faster than we could build silos and fill them with 
missiles, at a fraction of the cost. Replacing Minuteman missiles with MX 
would m-erely provide Soviet marksmen with more lucrative targets. 
Launch-on-warning policies (sometimes called launch-under-confirmed-attack) 
could strengthen deterrence by increasing uncertainty in the Soviet camp, but 
could be prudently implemented only if the Kremlin promised to leave the U.S. 
alert apparatus intact. Otherwise, our President, lacking proper input, 
might opt for a response completely out of proportion to the provocation, 
with ruinous results. 
The long-term utility of fixed-site systems might be extended by early 
deployment of ballistic missile defense, but the SALT I ABM Treaty allows 
just 100 launchers, and suitable technology is still immature. Such a small , 
force would leave eight of our nine ICBM fields uncovered. Many political 
and economic impediments oppose rescinding that pact, if Moscow refused to 
renegotiate. 
Pressures to supplement or partly supplant our silo-based force thus are 
powerful. Four options perhaps should take top priority (sequence numbers 
108, 112, 116, and 117 from the smorgasbord of possibilities in Table I). 










Option 1: Substitute Semi-Mobile ICBMs 
Semi-mobile ICBM systems (SM ICBMs) constitute large-scale "shell games." 
Each MX transport, according to some current concepts, could rotate randomly 
among 23 reinforced structures along a linear route or closed loop 
"racetrackw 15-20 miles long, then dash to a new destination at the last 
moment. Other basing modes might include covered trenches, hardened open 
trenches, pinwheels, and multiple vertical structures, to cite a few samples. 
SM ICBMs, however, compromise between hardness and mobility, 
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Maneuverability is strictly limited and associated shelters are less 
protective than silos. The system is more survivable than its fixed-site 
f.orerunner only if true target locations remain secret and the number of 
shelters exceed the Soviet stock of weapons with sufficient lethality. SM 
ICBXs could therefore be smothered by a first strike, unless some sort of 
S.ALT ceiling controls the quantity of large Soviet launchers and the legal 
load of independently targetable warheads ?er missile to such an extent that 
K.S. shelters exceed the stock of sufficienzly lethal weapons the Soviets 
could allocate to destroy them. Failing thac, U.S. semi-mobile missile 
deployments would have to be expanded far beyond present COntemplati~n, be 
defended, or both. 
in any event, the prOliferaZlOn of known aiming points on American soil 
could invite Saturation attacks of much greater magnitude than the Soviets 
would now need to swamp our 1,054 silos if deterrence failed for any reason. 
Critics al-so complain about construction costs and. completion times, plus 
societal and environmental implications. 
Option 2: Substitute Freely Mobiie ICBMs 
Freely mobile ICBM systems (FM ICBMs) mountea on trucks, trains, tracked 
vehicles, ground effects machines, river barges, and even lake-based 
submarines are essentially separate from semi-mobile models in one important 
military respect: they eliminate a known number of precisely located targets 
for enemy marksmen to hit. Backers believe thac even a very large Soviet 
f-orce would lack ample means to cripple the freely mobile land-launched leg 
of our triad with a full-scale assault, unless equipped with supersensitive 
surveillance devices and "smart" weapons that 1oc.k onto moving objects. 
Acquisition costs are cheap compared with semi-mobile models (although 
operating costs are more expensive). 
FM ICBMs, however, are saddled with shortfalls of their own. Barrages of 
enemy MIRVs might blanket suspected hiding places in the United States. 
Protection against sabotage would pose special problems for missiles in the 
open, either stopped or in transit. Political opposition to nuclear weapons 
roaming public roads and rail lines is particularly strong. Arms controllers 
lament inabilities to verify how many mobile launchers are deployed. 
Option 3: Substitute Surface Ship Ballistic Missiles 
Some strategists prefer to remove as many targets as possible from the 
American land mass. One school therefore suggests that surface ship 
ballistic missiles (SSBMs) would make better replacements for fixed-site 
ICBMs than any semi-mobile or freely mobile land-based model, although SALT 
I1 as presently prescribed prohibits this option. 
The concept calls for transport ship hulls to be modified as special 
purpose launch platforms. Tests with Polaris SLBMs proved practical in the 
early 1960s. Such vessels could fool satellite sensors, but not close visual 
verification. Prelaunch survival would depend primarily on mingling missile 
carriers with legitimate merchantmen on crowded shipping lanes. It would be 
easier to pick up the trail of surface ships than submarines when they leave 
port, and easier to track them thereafter, but crisscrossing paths and decoys 
still would make it difficult to differentiate false leads from true targets. 
Even if all could be detected at any given time, the Soviets still would be 
taxed to attack the total SSBM fleet simultaneously, together with two other 
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legs of our triad. U.S. National Command Authorities could maintain radio 
contact with SSBMs and transmit emergency orders more surely than with 
submerged submarines. 
Option 4: Substitute Hydra 
Hydra is the most revolutionary sea-launched missile system. Submarines 
(including SUM) and/or surface ships in any combination desired mount 
ballistic missiles internally or externally, either in canisters or modified 
to waterproof and improve bare missile buoyancy. Crews release those packets 
to float free in times of crises, far from the carriers and each other. 
Firings are triggered on call from remote positions at sea or ashore. All 
components could be recovered if Zhreats recede and requirements to launch 
disappear, according to the concept, which Navy personnel tested in part in 
the early 1960s. 
Hydra missiles theoretically could be affixed to all sorts of carriers 
with collateral functions (some ships, for example, might also transport 
cargo). Serious conflicts between ' main and secondary missions, however, 
would likely occur. Special purpose platforms, purchased at increased cost, 
would be more appropriate. 
Releasing weapons in response to strategic warning would violate present 
nuclear safety regulations. That act also could catalyze Soviet strikes 
instead of reducing tension. Hostile surveillance ships might find and 
confiscate or destroy free-floating U.S. missiles, unless steps were taken to 
prevent detection. 
Such problems seem solvable, but some champions of the Hydra system prefer 
tighter control. Their alternative concept calls for spontaneous launch to 
start as soon as missiles hit the water. Hydra in such case would lose its 
unique prelaunch survival properties. Costs, however, would still be less and 
carrying capacities greater than for submarines and surface ships designed to' 
launch ballistic missiles from batteries on board. 
Option 5: Substitute SUM 
A fifth option, which does not show on Table I ,  considers Shallow 
Underwater Missiles (SUM) on small coastal submarines as possible 
replacements for fixed-site ICBMs. 
The original intent was to operate SUM from submerged positions on the 
U.S. continental shelf, where submarines might even remain motionless on the 
bottom for prolonged periods. Communication links would be simple. Soviet 
seekers would find it difficult to separate true signals from background 
clutter close to U.S. shores. 
That concept, however, proved impractical, since SUM vessels apparently 
would be vulnerable to the Van Dorn effect. A single Soviet nuclear weapon 
detonated in deep water near our continental shelf would sweep the shallows 
for 100-200 miles with waves perhaps exceeding 100 feet in height. Even a 
few such blasts would be ruinous. SUM, confronted with those conditions, 
must move to deeper patrol stations that reduce many of its advantages. 
Bottom-sitting, for example, is not possible on steep continental slopes or 
at sites submerged much more than 1,000 feet. The fact that SUM remains 
within range of shore-based ASW support is not directly important. The U.S. 
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Navy exerts no control over international waters in peacetime, and thus would 
be in poor position to protect SUM prior to a Soviet first strike. At best, 
Soviet ASW concentrations near the United States would ring alarm bells and 
allow our retaliatory forces to improve their routine readiness posture. 
SUM and deep water SLBMs consequently compete for primacy within a single 
functicnal ciass, just as one of many basing modes would best serve mobile 
ICBMs. The integrity of our triad would remain inzact if one suS-launched 
ballistic missile system replaced the other, but switching missiles in silos 
for SUM, while sticking, say, with Trident, would create a strategic nuclear 
dyad instead of strengthening a three-iegged strum' -ur=e. 
Replace 3ombers with ALCMs 
Bombers are advertised as the most flexible of all strategic delivery 
systems. They can satisfy requirements across the conflict spectrum, from 
shows of force to nuclear combat. They can function as manned penetrators 
carrying diversified payloads, or as standoff missile carriers. Heavy 
bombers also have the hypothetical ability to engage a series of 
widely-separated targets; to locate, track and destroy moving objects; and to 
crack the hardest known structures. Crews can assess post-strike damage and 
enemy activities (such as the rapid reloading of missile launch facilities), 
then take acticn on their own or recommend responses to responsible 
headquarters. 
On examination, however, at least two of those claims seem extravagant. 
Time-sensitive hard targets, for instance, are mainly immune to attacks by 
the fastest bombers, whose reflexes simply are too slow to engage enemy alert 
fcrces. The competence of aircraft to strike several successive targets with 
Sombs is also dubious -- survival prospects could drop sharply when intruders 
proceed from one heavily defended objective to another, despite "black boxv 
support and defense supression support from other triad components. 
Converting sophisticated strategic aircraft for tactical roles in regional 
combat, however brief, does not bolster nuclear deterrence. On the contrary, 
committing them to secondary missions can detracc. As a result of 3-52 
drawdowns during operations in Southeast Asia, the size of the SAC alert 
force slumped by 15%. Capabilities of a Smaller force would be degraded even 
further, and combat losses like those SAC suffered over the Red River Delta 
in December 1972 could prove unsupportable. (The original B-1 buy was to be 
just 244 aircraft). 
In short, heavy bombers seem less attractive tactically than advocates 
assert, and are rather rigid strategically, being better suited for "assured 
destruction" purposes than for countersilo options. 
Beyond that, the deterrent value of U.S. strategic nuclear bombers 
continues to decline at a rate inversely proportionate to the age of our 
B-52s, which already ar'e older than most of their crews. Modernization, 
however, faces no insurmountable impediments. Replacing B-52s with B-1s or 
some advanced system that incorporates "Stealth" technology would reduce 
dangers to U.S. bombers. Pre-launch survivability would improve because 
alert aircraft not only could "scrambleu more quickly, but could disperse to 
many strips with short runways. (Tankers, however, will be denied that 
advantage until superior substitutes for KC-135s deploy in strength). Faster 
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speeCs and Setter "black box" support should also make it possible to breach 
Soviet air defenses that could defeat B-52s. 
A key question, therefore, follows: Would it be cost-effective to 
refurbish SAC'S bomber force to foster betcer capabilities within its rather 
restricted scope, or would some other airbreathing system be more 
satisfactory? 
There is no way to accommodate SLCMs or ALBMs without accepting structural 
defects, such as excessive stress on submarine-launched systems, total 
reliance on ballistic missiles, or adopting a quadrad at extra expense. 
Four options therefore seem to take top priority, if decisions are made to 
switch (sequence numbers 111, 115, 118, and 119 in Table I). They are the 
same as Options 1-4 already discussed, but change two legs of the triad 
instead of one by substituting air-launched cruise m-issiles for manned 
bombers: 
SM ICBM FM ICBM SSBM Hydra 
SLBM SLBM SLBM SLBM 
ALCM ALCM ALCM ALCM 
Pre-launch survival problems for ALCM carriers are similar to those of 
strategic bombers. They could be launched on warning in the same way, under 
positive control, subject to recall if required. Wile-bodied transports are 
less responsive than high-performance aircraft, because they need more time 
to taxi and take off. Vertical/short take-off and landing (V/STOL) 
characteristics would alleviate that problem, but lift capabilities are 
limited. 
Once aloft, security would improve temporarily. Opponents, however, 
almost certainly would hope to destroy U.S. carriers before the crews could 
launch any missiles. Otherwise, anti-aircraft units would have to hit a 
horde of separate projectiles, instead of one compact target. Barrage 
attacks against flight corridors over U.S. soil could be expected. 
Cruise missiles are less adaptable than manned aircraft. Range 
restrictions are set in concrete, since in-flight refueling is impossible 
(although auxiliary tanks can be mounted in some cases). Once a current 
generation missile has been fired, it can neither be recalled nor recovered. 
After separating from delivery vehicles, cruise missiles depend heavily on 
compact radar cross-sections, low infrared signatures, and terrain-hugging 
capabilities to assist in breaching defenses. They currently lack active 
penetration aids and elaborate electronic countermeasure (ECM) packets, are 
unable to take evasive action, and cannot cope with contingencies. 
Supersonic speeds would help, but U.S. systems now in development are 
subsonic. Low, slow approaches, however, encourage accuracies that as yet 
are unattainable by ballistic missiles. An inertial guidance system, 
periodically updated enroute, can reduce errors to a few feet. If the 
missiles are fitted with warheads of sufficient yield, they can crush very 
hard structures, but most time-sensitive and mobile targets could avoid 
destruction. 
Aside from the launch platforms, ALCMs come at "cut-ratew prices, compared 
w i t h  o t h e r  s y s t e m s .  T h e l r  g r e a t e s t  s t r e n g t h ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  m i g h t  b e  r e a l i z e d  b y  
d e p l o y i n g  s u f f i c ~ e n t  n u m b e r s  t o  o v e r l o a d  o p p o s i n g  d e f e n s e s .  E l e c t i n g  t o  
d e p l o y  ALCMs i n s t e a d  o f  m a n n e d  p e n e t r a t i n g  b o m S e r s ,  h o w e v e r ,  w o u l d  s w a p  a 
p r o v e n  s y s t e m  f o r  new t e c h n o l o g y  t h a t  s k i l l  c o n t a i n s  
W H A T  U . S .  FOXCE LEVELS? 
S u c c e s s i v e  S e c r e t a r i e s  o f  D e f e n s e  c o n c e d e  t h a t  n o n e  o f  t h e  t r i a d ' s  l e g s  
n e e d  t o  s t a n d  a l o n e .  C u m u l a t i v e  c a p a b i l i t i e s  s h o u l C  s i m p l y  b e  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  
w i t h s t a n d  a s t r o n g  a t t a c k ,  t h e n  r e t a l i a z e  e f f e c t i v e l y  i n  w a y s  t h a ~  s e r v e  U . S .  
i n t e r e s t s .  
U .S .  t r i a d  c o n t i n g e n t s  w e r e  i n s t a l l e d  i n  t h e  1 9 6 0 s  t o  s u p p c r t  a 
c o u n t e r v a l u e  s t r a t e g y  c a l l e d  " a s s u r e d  d e s t r u c t i o n w .  T h e  m a i n  m i s s i o n  t h e n  
was m e r e l y  t o  c o v e r  2 0 0 - o d d  u r b a n  t a r g e t s  w i t h  a  h i g h  d e g r e e  o f  c o n f i d e n c e ,  
a f t e r  a c c o u n t i n g  f o b  a b o r t s ,  a t t r i t i o n ,  a n d  d e l i v e r y  e r r o r s  t h a t  c o u l d  r e d u c e  
U.S.  r e t a l i a t o r y  c a p a b i l i t i e s .  D e f e n s e  S e c r e t a r y  M c N a m a r a ,  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  
a r c h i t e c t ,  a s s u m e d  t h a t  r e s o u r c e s .  a b l e  t o  e r a d i c a t e  " s a y ,  o n e - f i f t h  t o  
o n e - f o u r t h  o f  t h e  S o v i e t  p o p u l a t i o n  a n d  o n e - h a l f  o f  S o v i e t  i n d u s t r i a l  
c a p a c i t y  w o u l d  s e r v e  a s  a n  e f f e c t i v e  d e t e r r e n t . "  
One  x h o u s a n d  M i n u t e m e n ,  e a c h  w i t h  a s i n g l e  w a r h e a d ,  w e r e  d e p l o y e d  t o  s u i t  
t h a t  p u r p o s e .  F o r c e  l e v e l s  f o r  SL3Ms,  w h i c h  a c t  a s  c o m p l e m e n t s ,  w e r e  n e v e r  
c z l c u l a t e d  a s  o b j e c t i v e l y .  T h e  o r i g i n a l  r e q u e s t  f o r  4 5  S u S m a r i n e s  w l t h  7 2 0  
m i s s i l e s  was a r b i t r a r i l y  c u t  t o  4 1  b o a t s  ( t o t a l  6 5 6  t u b e s ,  e a c h  c o n t a i n i n g  a 
o n e - w a r h e a d  m i s s i l e )  w i t h o u t  a n y  a p p a r e n t  a b r i d g e m e n t  o f  e s s e n t i a l  
c a p a b i l i t i e s .  M o r e  t h a n  6 0 0  8 - 5 2  b o m b e r s  w e r e  a s s i g n e d  t o  SAC. 
S o v i e t  p o w e r  s i n c e  t h a t  t l m e  h a s  i n c r e a s e d  i m m e n s e l y  i n  a b s o l u t e  a n d  
r e l a t i v e  t e r m s ,  r e d u c i n g  p r e - l a u n c h  s u r v i v a l  a n d  p e n e t r a t i o n  p r o s p e c t s  f o r  
p a r t s  of o u r  t r i a d .  U.S .  strategy, w h i c h  now s z r e s s e s  a r a n g e  o f  n u c l e a r  
o p t i o n s  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  " a s s u r e d  d e s t r u c t i o n v ,  c a l l s  f o r  f a r  g r e a t e r  
f i r e p o w e r .  
A m e r i c a ' s  ICBM a n d  SLBM l a u n c h e r  l e v e l s ,  h o w e v e r ,  h a v e  s t a y e d  s t a t i c  s i n c e  
1 9 6 7 .  T h e  l a t t e r  r e c e n t l y  d r o p p e d  f r o m  6 5 6  t u b e s  c o  5 7 6 ,  b e c a u s e  t w o  P o l a r i s  
b o a t s  a r e  b e i n g  d e c o m m i s s i o n e d  a n d  t h r e e  m o r e  a r e  b e i n g  c o n v e r t e d  t o  a t t a c k  
s u b m a r i n e s .  SLBM s t r e n g t h s  w i l l  n o t  i n c r e a s e  u n t i l  t h e  f i r s t  T r i d e n t  c l a s s  
s u S m a r i n e  d e p l o y s  l a t e  i n  1 9 8 1  o r  e a r l y  i n  1 9 8 2 .  H e a v y  b o m b e r  h o l d i n g s  a r e  
s c a r c e l y  h a l f  t h e i r  p e a k  s t r e n g t h .  
Many b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s  now a r e  MIRVed ( 5 5 0  M i n u t e m a n  I I I s ,  n o r m a l l y  w i t h  
t h r e e  w a r h e a d s  a p i e c e ;  4 9 6  P o s e i d o n  a n d  T r i d e n t  I S i B M s ,  w h i c h  a v e r a g e  1 0 ) .  
B - 5 2 s  c a r r y  b i g g e r  l o a d s .  E v e n  s o ,  t a r g e t  c o v e r a g e  r e p o r t e d l y  f a l l s  s h o r t  o f  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  e s t a b l i s h e d  b y  P r e s i d e n t i a l  D i r e c t i v e  5 9  (PD 5 9 ) .  
How w e l l  e n d s  a n d  m e a n s  r e a l l y  m a t c h  c o u l d  b e  a s c e r t a i n e d  o n l y  b y  
c o m p a r i n g  s u r v i v a b l e  f o r c e  l e v e l s  w i t h  c l a s s i f i e d  t a r g e t  l i s t s ,  w h i c h  i s  
b e y o n d  t h e  s c o p e  o f  t h i s  b r i e f .  S u f f i c e  i t  t o  s a y  t h a t  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  n u m b e r  
o f  U . S .  d e l i v e r y  v e h i c l e s  a n d  n u c l e a r  w e a p o n s  c o u l d  b e  c a l c u l a t e d  f o r  e a c h  
l e g  o f  o u r  t r i a d  w i t h  much g r e a t e r  o b j e c t i v i t y  t h a n  p r e v i o u s l y ,  w h e t h e r  
s y s t e m s  a n d  S o v i e t  t h r e a t s  r e m a i n  c o n s t a n t  o r  c h a n g e .  A c c u r a t e  c o u n t s  a r e  
c r i t i c a l ,  b e c a u s e  s h o r t a g e s  u n d e r c u t  U . S .  s e c u r i t y  a n d  e x c e s s e s  f r i t t e r  a w a y  
f u n d . s .  
TZNTATIVE FINDINGS 
T h e r e  i s  no  way t o  i d e n t i f y  t h e  v i c e s  a n d  v i r t u e s  o f  s y s t e m s  s u c h  a s  
Minu teman  v e r s u s  M X ,  T r i d e n t  v e r s u s  P o s e i d o n ,  o r  B-52s  v e r s u s  B - l  w i t h o u t  
a n a l y z i n g  c o m b i n a t i o n s  i n  c o n t e x t  w i t h  s p e c i f i c  s y s t e m  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  h a r d  
c o s t  d a t a ,  a u t h o r i t a t i v e  t h r e a t  e s t i m a t i o n s ,  t a r g e t  d i s t r i b u t i o n  by n u m b e r  
a n d  t y p e ,  a n d  a r m s  c o n t r o l  g o a l s .  T h i r d  p a r t y  t h r e a t s ,  c i v i l  d e f e n s e ,  a i r  
d e f e n s e ,  A B M ,  a n d  A S W  a l l  s h o u l d  b e  c o n s i d e r e d .  . 
A f ew  t e n t a t i v e  f i n d i n g s  n e v e r t h e l e s s  e m e r g e .  
Any f o r t h c o m i n g  U.S.  . f o r c e  p o s t u r e  n o t  a c c o m p a n i e d  by c o n v i n c i n g  
j u s t i f i c a t i o n  s h o u l d  b e  v i e w e d  w i t h  c a u t i o n  i f  i t  p l a n s  t o :  
-- E x p a n d  o r  c o n t r a c t  t h e  U.S.  t r i a d  by  a d d i n g  o r  s u b s t r a c t i n g  
s y s t e m s .  
- - E x p a n d  e x i s t i n g  f o r c e  l e v e l s .  
- - C o n t a i n  two o r  more  l a n d - ,  a i r - ,  o r  s u b m a r i n e - l a u n c h e d  
s y s t e m s .  
-- C o n t a i n  two o r  more  a i r b r e a t h i n g  s y s t e m s .  
- - E x c l u d e  a i r b r e a t h i n g  s y s t e m s .  
-- R e t a i n  f i x e d - s i t e  ICBMs. 
-- I n c l u d e  u n d e f e n d e d  s e m i - m o b i l e  ICBMs, u n l e s s  SALT 
l i m i t s  S o v i e t  w a r h e a d s  s u f f i c i e n t l y .  
-- R e p l a c e  a l l  t h r e e  c o m p o n e n t s  i n  o u r  p r e s e n t  t r i a d .  
D e c i s i o n m a k e r s  a l s o  w o u l d  d o  w e l l  t o  b a l a n c e  b e n e f i t s  a g a i n s t  l i a b i l i t i e s  
b e f o r e  a p p r o v i n g  a n y  o p t i o n  t h a t  r e t a i n s  p a r t  o f  a p r e s e n t  s y s t e m  a f c e r  t h e  
r e s t  i s  r e p l a c e d  ( s u c h  a s  a  mix  o f  manned p e n e t r a t i n g  b o m b e r s  w i t h  ALCMs o r  
f i x e d - s i t e  w i t h  m o b i l e  ICBMs).  
L E G I S L A T I O N  
P . L .  9 7 - 3 9 ,  S .  6 9 4  
D e p a r t m e n t  o f  D e f e n s e  S u p p l e m e n t a l  A u t h o r i z a t i o n  A c t ,  1 9 8 1 .  A u t h o r i z e s  
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v e h i c l e s  a n d  f o r  r e s e a r c h ,  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  t e s t ,  a n d  e v a l u a t i o n .  I n c r e a s e s  t h e  
a c t i v e  d u t y  p e r s o n n e l  a n d  s t r e n g t h s  o f  t h e  Navy,  M a r i n e  C o r p s ,  a n d  A i r  F o r c e .  
I n c r e a s e s  t h e  number  o f  r e s e r v e  c o m p o n e n t  members  a u t h o r i z e d  t o  s e r v e  o n  
f u l l - t i m e  d u t y  w i t h  t h e  M a r i n e  C o r p s  R e s e r v e .  I n c r e a s e s  t h e  number  o f  
c i v i l i a n  p e r s o n n e l  a u t h o r i z e d  f o r  t h e  D e p a r t m e n t  o f  D e f e n s e .  H . R .  2 6 1 4  
i n t r o d u c e d  Mar. 1 8 ,  1 9 8 1 ;  r e f e r r e d  t o  t h e  C o m m i t t e e  on Armed S e r v i c e s .  
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of H.R. 3519. Conferences held. Conference report filed in the House 
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CHRCNOLOGY OF EVENTS 
10/29/81 -- The Department of Defense attacked CIA testimony that 
B-52s will have the capability to penetrate Soviet defefises 
almost as well as the B-1. DOD accused the CIA of testifying 
without knowledge of major changes that have been planned 
for the B-1. 
10/28/81 -- The CIA testified that existing B-52s will be able to 
penetrate Soviet air defenses until 1990, according to 
Senator Ted Stevens, thus contradicting the 
Administration's argument for the B-1. Senator Stevens 
said the B-1 is ''really nothing more than a hedgew until 
Stealth is in production. 
10/16/81 -- Northrop Corp. has been awarded the prime contract for 
Stealth technology research and development. I t  
is estimated that the new strategic bomber, which 
allegedly will absorb radar rather than reflect 
it and thus elude Soviet air defenses, will be 
operational in the early 1990s. 
10/07/81 -- chairman Price of the House Armed Services Committee 
denounced President Reagan's plan to place MX i n  
existing Titan silos. In 3earings before that 
Committee, Price stated, "No evidence available to 
date indicates that hardening a limited number 
of silos will provide any significant added 
survivability in the face of the increasing accuracy 
of Soviet strategic missiles." 
10/06/81 -- General Jones, Chalrman of the Jolnt C h ~ e f s  of 
Staff, would not endorse che A d m l n ~ s t r a t ~ o n ~ s  plan 
for baslng the MX In testimony before the Senate 
Armed Servlces Committee, a c d  agaln expressed hls 
support for the "shell game" plan prcposed by 
President Carter. 
10/02/81 -- President Reagan announced his plan to "close the 
window of vulnerability," which called for placing 
the first 3 6  of 100 MX missiles in existing Titan 
silos and building 100 a-1 bombers. 
09/09/81 -- None of the MX-basing possibilities being considered 
by the Administration is "without serious risks, high 
costs, important uncertainties, or significant 
drawbacksw according to a study by the Congressional 
Office of Technology Assissment. The report suggested 
that deploying the missiles on small suSmarines is 
the most technically feasible solutio-n. 
08/25/81 -- No land-based version of the MX can survive a 
Soviet attack without an an~i-ballistic missile 
system, according to the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Research and Development. Richard Delauer said 
it is likely the Pentagon will hasten development 
of ballistic missile interceptors. 
07/17/81 -- Marshal Ogarkov, Soviet armed forces chief of 
staff, indicated the Soviet Union has begun a buildup 
of strategic nuclear forces in response to "aggressive, 
militant" U.S. behavior. 
03/16/81 -- Defense Secretary Weinberger named a 15-member -panel 
to reevaluate MX basing options. The non-government 
experts are to report their findings to Weinberger 
July 1. 
02/14/81 -- The U.S. Air Force recommends that production of a B - l  
bomber variant Segin production at an early date, and that 
development of a "Stealth" bomber be expedited. 
01/28/81 -- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General 
David Jones, stressed the need for a new 
strategic bomber. "Deploying a new manned penetrator 
should be a top priority among the new strategic 
initiatives that we need to pursue," Jones 
stated to the Senate Armed Services Committee. 
-- Secretary of Defense Weinberger has ordered a 
study on the feasibility of sea-basing the MX 
as an alternative to the racetrack mode favored by 
the Carter Administration. 
01/18/81 -- MX "must be the nation's highest priority" in the 
coming years to counter U.S. ICBM vulnerability, 
according to Strategic Air Command (SAC) commander 
General Richard Ellis. He said the increased yield 
and accuracy of Soviet ICSMs "have put our Minutemen 
at risk to the point where . . .  we could zot respond 
effectively ~n a coherent manner." 
-01/06/81 -- Casper Weinberger, Secretary of Defense designate, 
speaking at confirmation hearings, said he "would want 
to examine a wide number of options" before approving 
a semi-mobile MX ICSM system. 
11/10/80 -- Strategic nuclear weapons improvement is emphasized 
in a draft Defense Department budget prepared by 
advisors to President-elect Reagan. Provisions include: 
beginning immediate production of the B-1 bomber, with 
an initial procurement of 100 aircraft, accelerating the 
MX program, with full operational capability by FY86, 
improving the Minuteman force, accelerating 
conversion of 8-52s to cruise missile carriers, 
accelerating Trident construction program to complete 
three boats per year rather than the current rate of one. 
11/03/80 -- The Soviet Union is pre-flight testing two new ICBMs, 
Aviation Week & Space Technology reports. Both are solid 
fueled and "extremely accurate" according co U.S. 
intelligenc,e officers. One is mobile. 
08/22/80 -- "Technical problems" within the Department of Energy 
have caused delays in the production of several nuclear 
weapons, including ?lark 12A warheads, planned to 
replace aging warheads on Minuteman I11 missiles. Also 
affected are an advanced nuclear warhead for the Army's 
Lance missile, and a new bomb to be deployed on B-52s. 
- - Technology that can make U.S. aircraft "invisible" to 
radar, thus enabling them to penetrate Soviet air defenses, 
was announced by Secretary of Defense Brown. He asserted 
that "stealthw technology, which allows the United States 
to build undetectable manned and unmanned aircraft, 
"alters the military balance significantly." 
08/21/80 -- The United States does not have enough strategic weapons 
to implement PD-59, according to Strategic Air 
Command (SAC) commander General Richard Ellis. "The 
principle of maintaining a countervailing strategy 
cannot be supported in the 1979-86 time period," 
Ellis wrote in a letter to Secretary of Defense 
Harold Brown. 
07/25/80 -- A shift in strategic nuclear targeting policy, from 
mutual assured destruction (MAD) toward one of 
"flexible response," was approved by President Carter. 
PD-59, as the revision is known, stresses a range of U.S. 
retaliatory options against military targets, in addition 
to massive retaliation against cities. 
04/30/80 -- The Pentagon has withdrawn plans to Sase the MX 
on a "race-track," citing cost as the primary 
factor. New plans call for deploying the mlssiles 
in shelters in a straight line, instead of the 
previously planned closed-loop. 
02/14/80 -- The Soviet Union has tested a new submarine-launched 
ballistic missile chat can carry larger nuclear weapons 
than presently deployed SLBKs. 
Encrypted telemetry prevented U.S. experts from 
gauging its accuracy. 
02/08/80 -- Senators Howard W. Cannon and Paul D. Laxalt of Nevada, 
together with Jake Garn and Orrin G. Hatch of Utah, 
formally asked President Carter to reconsider the MX 
racetrack basing mode. They prefer a system that 
"would be cheaper, more effective, and come on line 
quicker . . . ." 
G1/30/80 -- National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) i138-79 
indicates that che Soviets could have 14,000 ICBM 
and SLBM warheads by 1989 if SALT I1 is not approved. 
The level would otherwise be limited to about 6,000 
in 1985, when the pact, I f  approved, would expire. 
01/29/80 -- Defense Secretary Brown estimates that Soviet SS-18 
and SS-19 ICBMs will place U.S. second-strike 
minutemen in mortal peril by 1981 or 1982, using "a 
relatively small part of that force." 
i1/09/79 -- The Senate authorized appropriations for MX, but 
expressed reservations on the "racetrackt' deployment 
recommended by the President. 
09/07/79 -- President Carter announced that the MX will be 
deployed in a "racetrackM configuration. A projected 
cost of $33 billion will deploy 200 MX ICBMs among 
4,600 horizontal shelters, situated in clusters 
connected by 23 closed loop roads. 
08/03/79 -- CINCSAC estimates that better Soviet air defenses 
will reduce B-52 penetration probaailities to about 75% 
by 1985, even if all proposed U.S. improvements 
bear fruit. 
07/09/79 -- Defense Secretary Harold Brown told the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee that the impending vulnerability 
of America's Minuteman ICBMs in Silos would persist 
even if the Soviets dismantled all of their SS-18 
missiles. 
06/01/78 -- Dr. William Perry, Under Secretary of Defense for 
Research and Engineering, stated the United States' 
cruise missile will be able to penetrate any Soviet 
air defense. "I believe we will be able to sustain 
the penetrability of the cruise missile in the 
indefinite future under any set of defense responses 
I am able to conceive of." 
08/02/78 -- Senator William Proxmire called the 
proposed Multiple Aiming Point (MAP) system 
"a strategic error of mammoth proportions," claiming 
that the Soviets could counter the MAP strategy at a 
fraction of the cost to the U.S. Proxmire says that 
advantage in throw weight and megatonnage could 
easily be converted into numbers of warheads to 
saturate U.S. sites. 
07/25/78 -- In his first news conference as Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Air Force General David C. Jones 
expressed his support for multiple aiming point (MAP) 
basing for'mobile ICBMs, which he called essential to 
reducing vulnerability of U.S. land-based missiles. 
06/30/78 -- As a result of an Air Force study reevaluating MX basing 
mode options, DOD preference for underground trenches 
has been replaced with the administration's preference 
for a method known as Multiple Aiming Point (MAP) basing, 
in which ICBM vulnerability would be reduced by deploying 
each missile in a field of up to 25 vertical shelters. 
Missiles would be shifted periodically and cove'rtly 
among these soft silos at dispersed positions. The 
plan could be applied to Minuteman as well. 
06/21/78 -- At the first public test of the Tomahawk air-launched 
cruise missile at White Sands, its performance against 
simulated defenses was termed "letter perfect." 
07/05/77 -- Department of Defense announced that the Minuteman I11 
productio'n line will-be shut down after the completion 
of the last ten missiles now under construction. 
06/30/77 -- President Carter announced his decision to halt 
production of the 3-1 bomber and to plan instead the 
deployment of air-launched Cruise missiles with 
modernized B-52s. 
06/02/77 -- Pentagon spokesman Thomas Ross amended White House 
contentions that Mark-12A warheads would give the 
United States a "temporary advantage," noting that 
even if they "were to work perfectly, we don't believe 
we would be able to knock out most of their Soviet 
silos because of our limited Minuteman force." 
06/01/77 -- White House Press Secretary Powell stated that the 
deployment of the Mark-12A nuclear warhead would give 
the United States a "temporary advantagew over the 
Soviet strategic arsenal. 
05/16/77 -- Soviet news weekly New Times warned that the cruise 
missile "was not a monopoly product of the USA," 
suggesting that U.S. deployment would be followed 
by soviet deployment of cruise missiles. 
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T a b l e  I 
COMPLETE LIST OF OPTIONAL TRIADS 
One hundred twenty  t r i a d s  a r e  m a t h e m a t i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e ,  w i t h  1 0  f u n c t i o n a l l y  
d i f f e r e n t  d e l i v e r y  sys tems  t o  choose  from: S t r a t e g i c  bombers; a i r - l a u n c h e d  
c r u i s e  missiles ( ALCMs) ; submarine-launched c r u i s e  m i s s i l e s  ( SLCMs) ; f i x e d - s i t e  
i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s  (ICBMs); semi-mobile I C B M s  (SM ICBMs); f r e e l y -  
mobi le  I C B M s  (FM ICBMs); a i r - l a u n c h e d  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s  (ALBMs); submarine- 
f aunched  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s  ( SLBMs) , i n c l u d i n g  s h a l l o w  w a t e r  m i s s i l e  (SUM) 
v a r i a n t s ;  f r e e - f l o a t i n g  b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s  l aunched  from s u r f a c e  s h i p s  o r  
submar ines  (Hydra) ;  and b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s  l aunched  d i r e c t l y  by s u r f a c e  s h i p s  
( SSBMs) . 
A l l  120 groups  a r e  l i s t e d  below, a r r a n g e d  by s t r u c t u r a l  c a t e g o r i e s .  
Combinat ions  t h a t  f i t  i n  more t h a n  one c a t e g o r y  a r e  i n c l u d e d  o n l y  once  t o  high- 
l i g h t  key c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  
UNDUE DEPENDENCE O N  AIRBREATHERS 








2 3 4  
Bomber Bomber Bomber 
AL CM .a CM AL CM 
ALBM ICBM SLBM 
9 10 11 
Bomber Bomber Bomber 
.L BM AL BM AL BM 
ICBM SLBM SM ICBM 
Bombers P l u s  SLCMs 
5 6 7 
Bomber Bomber Bomber 
ALCM AL,CM ALCM 
SM I C B N  FY ICBM Hydra 
12 13 14 
Bomber Bomber Bomber 
AL BM AL BM AL BM 
FM I C B M  Hydra SSBM 
1 5  16 17 18 19 20 2 1 
Bomber Bomber Bomber Bomber Bomber Bomber Bomber 
SL CM SL CM SL CM SL CM SL CM SL CM SL CM 
ALBM ICBM SLBM SM I C B M  FM I C B M  Hydra S SBM 
A L C m  P l u s  ALBMs o r  SLCMs  
22 23 2 4 2 5 2 6  2 7  2 8  2 9 
ALCM AL CM ALCM ALCM ALCM AL CM ALCM ALCM 
AL BM AL BM S L  CM S L  CM S L  CM S L  CM S L  CM S L  CM 
I C B M  SLBM ICBM SLBM SM ICBM FM I C B M  H y d r a  SSBM 
NOTHING BUT B A L L I S T I C  M I S S I L E S  
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FM ICBM 
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SM ICBM 
B o m b e r  
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SM ICBM FM ICBM H y d r a  SSBM SM ICBM FM ICBM 
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H y d r a  SSBM H y d r a  
4 7 48 
S L  BM SLBM 
SM ICBM FM I C B M  
SSBM H y d r a  
5 3 5 4 5 5 
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SSBM S S  BM SM ICBM FM ICBM 
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UNDUE DEPENDENCE,  LAND-LAUNCHED M I S S I L E S  
66 6 7 68 6 9 
I C B M  I C B M  I C B M  I C B M  
FM ICBM SM ICBM FM ICBM SM ICBM 




H y d r a  
4 4  
AL BM 
H y d r a  
S S  BM 
5 0 
S L  BM 




S L  BM 
H y d r a  
6 4 
I C B M  
H y d r a  
SSBM 
7 0  
I C B M  
FM ICBM 
S L  CM 
7 1 72 7 3 
SM I C B M  SM I C B M  SM I C B M  
FM ICBM FM ICBM FM ICBM 

















UNDUE DEPENDENCE, SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED MISSILES 
7 5 7 6 7 7 7 8 
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COMPLETE CHANGE TO PRESENT TRIAD 
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BEST BALANCED STRUCTURES 
I n c l u d e  H a r d - S i t e  ICBMs 
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Bomber ALCM AL CM 
1 0 6  
ICBM 
SL CM 























Eliminate Land-Launched Missiles 
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